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requested the court to consider placing Papse on probation. (Sentencing Tr., 
p.31, L.25 - p.32., L.3.4) In response, the prosecutor argued: 
Yeah, I think this presentence pretty much speaks for itself 
when you look at that prior record. I was just looking through them, 
and I guess what concerns me the most is that his crimes have not 
slowed down in the past 30, 40 years. In the sixties he had four 
crimes, one of which was a DUI; in the seventies, three, two of 
which were a felony; in the eighties, four crimes, three felonies; in 
the nineties three crimes, but no felonies; and then you look at 
2000, and he's got as many or more in the decade beginning in 
2000 than he does in any of those other decades: Sixties, 
seventies, eighties, nineties. The four prior decades prior to 2000, 
he's got more crimes that he's committed so far this decade. 
So Mr. Papse is not slowing down. He might be 60 years 
oid, but his criminal record is continuing on a rapid pace. So I think 
in the factors that the Court needs to consider in imposing a 
sentence, I think that protecting society is most important. And, 
obviously, [defense counsel] alluded to that in his comments. 
So although Mr. Papse might be hoping for probation today, 
think that prison is the only alternative in this case. So it's, I 
guess, with great enthusiasm today that I come before the Court 
and recommend to the Court a four-year prison sentence with 
those first two years fixed. · 
(Sentencing Tr., p.32, L.13 - p.33, L.15.) Following the prosecutor's sentencing 
recommendation, defense counsel argued: 
Well, that was enthusiasm from the part of the prosecutor, 
and I-
Well, it's just that, you know, in the course of coming up with 
a plea agreement, as I'm sure that the Court is aware, when we get 
a recommendation from the prosecutor, we hope that it at least 
would be something other than an argument for not taking that 
recommendation and then giving it. 
4 The transcript of the sentencing hearing (Sentencing Tr.) was attached to 
Papse's affidavit in support of his post-conviction petition and appears at pages 
20 through 24 of the clerk's record. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 28565 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
J.:1~1\1ES MURPHY KENNEDY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
2003 Opinion No. 38 
Filed: May 12, 2003 
Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk 
_________________ ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge. 
Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of seven years, with a minimum 
period of confinement of two years, for trafficking in methamphetamine by 
attempted manufacture, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Paul S. Sonenberg, Deputy 
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ralph Reed Blount, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
PERRY, Judge 
James Murphy Kennedy appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his plea 
of guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing. We affirm in part, 
vacate in part, and remand. 
Kennedy was charged with conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine by manufacturing. 
In the midst of trial, Kennedy entered into a plea agreemeµt with the state whereby he agreed to 
plead guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing. LC. § 37-
2732B(a)(3). Defense counsel summarized the plea agreement by stating that "Kennedy will 
plead to Count 1, an attempt to manufacture, the state will recommend two years fixed required 
by the statute, will not make a recommendation on an indeterminate, leave that in the judge's 
discretion." The district court thereafter accepted Kennedy's guilty plea. 
I 
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor acknowledged the plea agreement. After 
discussing the facts of the case, Kennedy's longstanding substance abuse problem, and 
Kennedy's criminal history, the prosecutor made the following recommendation: 
I think the two years fixed, Judge, is appropriate, and I think a substantial period 
of indeterminate time is warranted in this defendant's case. Not necessarily, 
Judge, so that he can serve a lot more time in the penitentiary, but obviously given 
his history, given the serious nature of this offense and his activities in this 
offense, as well as his attitude and disposition in the presentence investigation, 
he's an individual for which I think that the Department of Correction needs to 
have a substantial period of supervision of this man. 
Kennedy did not object to the prosecutor's comments. The district court imposed a unified 
seven-year sentence, with a minimum period of confinement of two years. 
Kennedy now appeals, asserting that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by 
recommending that the indeterminate portion of Kennedy's sentence be substantial. Kennedy 
seeks specific performance of the plea agreement, arguing that his case should be remanded for 
resentencing before a different district judge. 
We note at the outset that Kennedy did not object to the prosecutor's recommendation of 
a substantial indeterminate sentence, nor did he move to withdraw his guilty plea. Ordinarily, 
this Court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal by an objection in the trial court. 
State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 645, 945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997). However, we 
may consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made below. 
See id. Fundamental error has been defined as error which goes to the foundation or basis of a 
defendant's rights, goes to the foundation of the case or takes from the defendant a right which 
was essential to his or her defense and which no court could or ought to permit to be waived. 
State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d 905, 911 (1994). Breach of a plea agreement by the 
state is fundamental error and, therefore, the failure to seek relief in the trial court does not 
preclude a defendant from raising the issue for the first time on appeal if the record is adequate 
for_thatpurpose. State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 744, 52 P.3d 886,889 (Ct. App. 2002); State 
v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 807, 809, 10 P.3d 756, 758 (Ct. App. 2000). Here, the transcript of the plea 
hearing sufficiently establishes the terms of the plea agreement, and we will consequently 
address Kennedy's claim of breach. 
When a plea res~ in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, 
so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
2 
fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). This principle is grounded in the 
Due Process Clause and the well-established rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both 
voluntary and intelligent. Afabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1984). See also State v. 
Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910,913,693 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Ct. App. 1985). Thus, when the 
prosecution breaches its promise with respect to a plea agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on 
a false premise and is entitled to relief. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509; State v. Seaman, 125 Idaho 955, 
957, 877 P.2d 926,928 (Ct. App. 1994). As a remedy, the court may order specific performance 
of the plea agreement or may permit the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea. Santobello, 404 
U.S. at 263; Seaman, 125 Idaho at 957, 877 P.2d at 928; Rutherford, 107 Idaho at 916, 693 P.2d 
at 1118. 
Under the circumstances presented in the instant case, we conclude that Kennedy has 
established that the state breached the plea agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the prosecutor 
promised not to make a recommendation regarding the indeterminate portion of Kennedy's 
sentence. Although the prosecutor did not recommend a specific indeterminate length, this Court 
notes that the agreement precluded the prosecutor from making any recommendation relative to 
the indeterminate term, including a recommendation that the indeterminate term of Kennedy's 
sentence be "substantial." 
Although Kennedy appeals from his judgment of conviction, he is not requesting to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Rather, Kennedy seeks specific performance of the plea agreement and 
resentencing before a different district judge who will not have heard the prosecutor's improper 
recommendation. Because Kennedy has requested relief in the form of specific performance, 
and because he has shown that he is entitled to such relief, we conclude that specific 
performance of the plea agreement is an appropriate remedy in this case. See Rutherford, I 07 
Idaho at 916, 693 P .2d at 1118. Therefore, we affirm Kennedy's judgment of conviction for 
trafficking in methamphetamine by attempted manufacturing, but we vacate Kennedy's sentence 
and-remand the case for resentencing before a different district judge. 
Chief Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR. 
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MELANSON, Judge 
Kirk Julliard Gosch appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his petition for 
post-conviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Gosch was found guilty by a jury of manufacturing a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-
2732(a); possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, LC. § 37-2732(a); and possession of 
marijuana in excess of three ounces, I.C. § 37-2732(e). Gosch filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel 
provided erroneous advice as to the potential consequences of filing an appeal. At an evidentiary 
hearing on this claim, Gosch asserted that he also received ineffective assistance of counsel 
because he asked counsel to file an appeal in his underlying criminal case, but no appeal was 
ever filed. The state did not object to the presentation of this additional claim at the evidentiary 
hearing, the parties argued the merits, and the district court considered the claim. In the district 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the judgment dismissing Gosch's 
petition, the district court determined that Gosch' s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
failed. Gosch appeals. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Gosch argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his petition for post-
conviction relief because he demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
based upon his trial counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal in his underlying criminal case 
despite Gosch's unequivocal request that counsel do so. 1 Thus, Gosch asserts that his case must 
be remanded to the district court for entry of an amended judgment of conviction to allow him to 
perfect a timely appeal. 
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and therefore the petitioner must prove the 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 699-700, 992 
P .2d 144, 148-49 (1999). On review, the appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual 
findings unless the factual findings are clearly erroneous. Id. at 700, 992 P.2d at 149. The 
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson 
v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct App. 2003). The appellate court exercises free 
review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Dunlap v. State, 141 
Idaho 50, 56, l 06 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-
conviction procedure act. A1urray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. 
App. I 992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show 
that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the 
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U . .§.: 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 
313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To e~ a deficiency, the petitioner has the 
Gosch does not challenge the district court's determination that Gosch's claim that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel provided erroneous advice as 
to the potential consequences of filing an appeal failed. 
2 
burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish 
prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different Id at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. 
The district court found that, after the jury rendered its verdict, Gosch left the courthouse 
with his counsel in a confused and stressful state and informed counsel that he wanted to "appeal 
everything." The district court also found that, upon making such request, counsel directed 
Gosch to contact counsel's office the next day by scheduling an appointment because counsel 
wanted to allow Gosch time "to digest the verdict, and more clearly articulate exactly what he 
wanted to appeal." The district court found that, thereafter, Gosch never scheduled an 
appointment and never spoke with counsel regarding an appeal. Additionally, the district court 
found that counsel made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Gosch following his request to 
"appeal everything," including an attempt to make the public defender's investigator available to 
Gosch prior to his sentencing. The district court also found that Gosch was notified at 
sentencing of his right to appeal. 
The district court correctly noted that, pursuant to Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 361-
62, 883 P.2d 714, 719-20 (Ct. App. 1994), a defendant who proves that he or she was denied an 
appeal because counsel did not file an appeal as requested states a meritorious claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel because the loss of the right to appeal is sufficient prejudice, in 
and of itself, to support such claim. In that case, Beasley filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief, asserting he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to file an 
appeal from Beasley's judgment of conviction. Beasley and his trial counsel testified at the 
hearing on his petition. Following the hearing, the district court denied relief and dismissed the 
petition, concluding that Beasley failed on his claim to show deficient performance by counsel or 
prejudice sufficient to satisfy the two-pronged standard for ineffective assistance derived from 
Strickland. Beasley, 126 Idaho at 359, 883 P.2d at 717. 
On appeal, this Court noted that it was undisputed that Beasley advised his counsel of his 
desire to appeal his conviction and that the record clearly showed that counsel understood 
Beasley desired to appeal. We determined that the loss of the opportunity to appeal due to 
counsel's failure to file an appeal when a criminal defendant requested that counsel do so was 
sufficient prejudice to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Beasley, 126 Idaho at 
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362, 883 P.2d at 720. Having determined that Beasley's counsel either neglected or refused to 
file an appeal despite Beasley's request, we concluded that deficient performance of counsel 
deprived Beasley of his opportunity to appeal and that prejudice was presumed from such 
performance. Id Accordingly, Beasley's judgment of conviction had to be vacated and 
reentered so Beasley could perfect a timely appeal. Id. 
Here, at the hearing on Gosch's petition, the district court stated: 
I think this case is distinguishable from Beasley in the sense that Mr. 
Gosch was afforded an opportunity to discuss an appeal. He was invited to make 
an appointment to discuss it And he failed to follow up on multiple opportunities 
to do so. The Court finds that based upon the distinguishing facts that he did not 
make a request after the judgment was filed, he did not make an appointment after 
he was invited to do so, that the Beasley rule doesn't apply. There was no binding 
request for an appeal to be filed. Accordingly, the petition is denied. 
In the written conclusions of law, the district court stated that Beasley was distinguishable from 
Gosch's case "because Beasley requested an appeal of his conviction, and the record clearly 
showed that trial counsel, and the public defender who assumed representation of Beasley after 
entry of his judgment of conviction, understood that Beasley desired to appeal." 
Relying upon Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 792 P.2d 964 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. 
Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 718 P.2d 1272 (Ct. App. 1986); and Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 657 
P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1983), the district court properly concluded that its decision should be based 
on whether Gosch' s desire to appeal was adequately communicated to his counsel and whether 
counsel's failure to file an appeal resulted from deficient performance that deprived Gosch of the 
opportunity to appeal. The district court then reiterated that, in this case, Gosch made a single 
request to "appeal everything" during a time of confusion and stress directly after the jury 
rendered its verdict and before a sentence or judgment had been entered. The district court again 
noted that, while Gosch's counsel directed him to set up an appointment to discuss a potential 
appeal, Gosch did not thereafter contact counsel or respond to attempted correspondence from 
counsel and never again evidenced a desire to appeal. The district court determined that Gosch's 
request to appeal was not ignored by counsel but, rather, Gosch ignored counsel. The district 
court also determined that it was not counsel's inaction that caused Gosch to not appeal, but 
Gosch's own inaction that resulted in failure to file an appeal. Thus, the district court concluded 
that Gosch' s request was not fully and fairly communicated to counsel so as to warrant a 
4 
conclusion that it was counsel's ineffective assistance that deprived Gosch of the opportunity to 
appeaL The district court finally concluded that counsel reasonably believed Gosch had 
abandoned any desire to file an appeal because Gosch ignored counsel's repeated attempts to 
communicate with Gosch regarding an appeal. Accordingly, the district court entered a 
judgment dismissing Gosch' s petition. 
It is undisputed that, after the jury rendered its verdict, Gosch requested that counsel 
"appeal everything." It is also undisputed that, thereafter, Gosch's counsel never filed an appeal. 
We conclude that the district court erred in determining that Gosch's case is distinguishable from 
Beasley such that Beasely does not apply in this case because Gosch requested that his counsel 
"appeal everything" after the jury rendered its verdict as opposed to after sentencing and entry of 
judgment. Specifically, LC. § 19-2317 provides: 
When the verdict given is such as the court may receive, the clerk must 
immediately record it in full upon the minutes, read it to the jury, and inquire of 
them whether it is their verdict. If any juror disagree, the fact must be entered 
upon the minutes and the jury again sent out; but if no disagreement is expressed, 
the verdict is complete, and the jury must be discharged from the case. 
A legal conviction occurs when a verdict or plea of guilty is accepted by the court. State v. 
Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273,278,581 P.2d 319,324 (1978). Idaho Appellate Rule l7(e)(2) provides 
that a notice of appeal filed from an appealable judgment or order before formal written entry of 
such document shall become valid upon the filing and placing of the stamp of the clerk of the 
court on such appealable judgment or order, without refiling the notice of appeal. Therefore, 
Gosch' s attorney could have filed an appeal after the jury rendered its verdict, but before entry of 
judgment, and such appeal would have become valid upon the filing and placing of the stamp of 
the clerk upon such judgment and without refiling. Thus, it is of no consequence that Gosch's 
request that counsel file an appeal occurred after the jury rendered its verdict as opposed to after 
sentencing and the entry of judgment 2 
The district court also erred in ruling that Beasley does not apply in this case because the 
record does not show Gosch's counsel did not understand that Gosch desired to appeal. At the 
hearing on Gosch's petition, Gosch's counsel testified that, after the jury rendered its verdict and 
2 We do not address a request to appeal a conviction made prior to the jury reaching a 
verdict. 
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counsel left the courthouse with Gosch, he requested that counsel "appeal everything." Thus, the 
record shows that Gosch's counsel understood that Gosch desired to appeal. 
Similarly, the district court erred in ruling that Gosch's request to file an appeal was not 
fully and fairly communicated to counsel because, after making such request, Gosch did not 
schedule an appointment with counsel as directed and did not respond to counsel's attempted 
correspondence prior to sentencing to discuss a potential appeal. This case is unlike Sanders 
where this Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Sanders' petition after the district 
court, when faced with conflicting evidence about whether Sanders ever requested an appeal, 
made a credibility determination and concluded that Sanders failed to communicate his desire to 
appeal to counsel. Sanders, 117 Idaho at 940-41, 792 P .2d at 965-66. Here, as noted above, it is 
undisputed that, after the jury rendered its verdict, Gosch requested that his counsel "appeal 
everything" and the record shows that counsel understood that Gosch desired to appeal. 
While the district court concluded that Gosch's failure to schedule an appointment with 
counsel as directed and failure to respond to correspondence from counsel after he requested that 
counsel "appeal everything" excused counsel from filing an appeal, such conclusion goes against 
this Court's holding in Beasley. Specifically, we held that if counsel either neglects or refuses to 
file an appeal despite a criminal defendant's request to do so, counsel is deficient. Beasley, 126 
Idaho at 362, 883 P.2d at 720. Whether counsel was able to make contact with Gosch after the 
jury rendered its verdict and Gosch requested that counsel "appeal everything," absent an express 
withdrawal of such request, counsel was required to file an appeal. 3 
The district court's conclusion that lack of contact with Gosch after he requested that 
counsel "appeal everything" excused counsel from filing an appeal is also contrary to the holding 
of the United States Supreme Court that: 
We have long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from 
the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally 
unreasonable. See Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S. Ct. 1715, 23 L. 
Ed. 2d 340 (1969); cf. Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 28, 119 S. Ct. 961, 
3 We also note that Gosch appeared at sentencing with counsel. Gosch's counsel testified 
at the hearing on Gosch's petition for post-conviction relief that, just prior to sentencing, counsel 
reviewed the presentence investigation report with Gosch but did not discuss the possibility of an 
appeal. Further, Gosch's counsel testified that she did not discuss the possibility of an appeal 
with Gosch after sentencing and entry of the judgment of conviction. 
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143 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1999) ("[W]hen counsel fails to file a requested appeal, a 
defendant is entitled to [ a new] appeal without showing that his appeal would 
likely have had merit"). This is so because a defendant who instructs counsel to 
initiate an appeal reasonably relies upon counsel to file the necessary notice. 
Counsel's failure to do so cannot be considered a strategic decision;filing a notice 
of appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to 
the defendant's wishes. 
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (emphasis added). Additionally, to require that, 
after a defendant makes a specific request that counsel file an appeal after the jury renders its 
verdict, the defendant must schedule an appointment with counsel if directed to do so or respond 
to attempted correspondence from counsel before such request will be honored permits counsel 
to condition the filing of an appeal upon such requirements. This goes against precedent 
indicating that the decision whether to prosecute an appeal rests with the defendant. See Mata v. 
State, 124 Idaho 588,593,861 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Ct App. 1993). 
Again, it is undisputed that in this case, after the jury rendered its verdict in Gosch's 
underlying criminal case, Gosch requested that counsel "appeal everything." The record shows 
that Gosch's counsel understood that Gosch desired to appeal and, thereafter, never filed an 
appeal. We hold that, when a defendant makes an unequivocal request that counsel file an 
appeal after the jury renders its verdict, counsel has an obligation to file such appeal unless the 
defendant thereafter expressly communicates to counsel that he or she no longer wishes to pursue 
the appeaL Here, there is no evidence that Gosch did so. 4 Thus, because Gosch's counsel did 
not file an appeal despite Gosch' s unequivocal request that counsel do so after the jury rendered 
its verdict and Gosch did not expressly withdraw his request, we conclude that deficient 
performance of counsel deprived Gosch of the opportunity to appeal and that prejudice is 
presumed from such performance. Therefore, the district court erred by dismissing Gosch's 
petition for post-conviction relief. Gosch's judgment of conviction must be amended to allow 
Gosch to perfect a timely appeal. 
4 We recognize that, after an appeal is filed, an appellant might abandon his or her desire to 
prosecute an appeal and that, presumably, such abandonment could be inferred from conduct 
such as failure to communicate with counsel. We need not decide that question here. 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
Gosch demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his 
counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal in his underlying criminal case. Accordingly, we 
vacate the district court's judgment dismissing Gosch's petition for post-conviction relief and 
remand to the district court for entry of an amended judgment of conviction consistent with this 
opinion. Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Gosch as the prevailing party on appeal. 
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR. 
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1 you want me to know about before I decide whether to 
2 accept your plea? 
1 A. What I told him was that the p1ea 
2 agreement was an agreement on the part of the 
3 The Defendant: I don't think so, Your 
4 Honor. 
5 The Court: Do you still wish to plead 
6 guilty? 
7 The Defendant: Yes, sir. 
8 The Court: Very well, sir, Based on 
9 that record, I'm satisfied that your plea of guilty 
10 is given knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
11 I direct clerk to enter your guilty plea of record, 
12 and based on your plea, I will find you guilty of 
13 driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, 
14 a repeated offense, as set out in the December 6, 
15 2007, information. 
16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Dewey. I'll go back to 
17 the transcript in just a second, but there's a couple 
18 of other things that I want to talk about 
19 specifically regarding Mr. Papse's allegations. 
20 Did you at any time tell your client at 
21 the time, Mr. Papse, that the plea agreement included 
22 the judge being on board, so to speak? 
23 A. No. I never did. 
24 Q. What did you tell him, if anything, 
25 about the judge's role in the plea agreement? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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recommendation, 
Q. Did he understand those things when you 
explained them to him as far as you know? 
A. Based on his responses that he gave me 
when we were fi!!ing out the agreement and what he 
6 did in court, I believe that he understood that. 
7 Q. Now, Mr. Dewey, Mr. Papse makes the 
8 assertion that you told him that the plea agreement 
9 , was contingent upon him answering questions posed by 
10 the district court as instructed by the attorney. Do 
11 you know what he could be asserting there or what he 
12 might be referencing? 
13 A. Well, I did tell him that he had to 
14 complete the questionnaire in order for his plea to 
15 be accepted. 
16 Q. Is that standard for you to tell your 
17 clients? 
18 A. Yes. You have to fill out the 
19 questionnaire, and If the questionnaire is not 
20 responsive in some regards -- in other words, if you 
21 say that it's not voluntarily entered, then the 
22 court's not going to the accept it. 
23 Q. So when he says that the plea agreement 
24 was contingent upon that, what would that mean? 
25 A. That meant that he had to fill out the 
Page 31 
3 prosecutor as to what he wouid recommend, I told hir 
4 that judge is not bound by that, that he can do 
5 whatever he wants to. That's why he gets to wear the 
6 black robe. 
7 Q. Isn't it true that, in fact, the judge 
8 did tell him that at the time of the change of plea 
9 as read into the record earlier? 
10 A. That's true. 
11 Q. Did you tell him anything else about 
12 what the judge's role in the plea agreement was? 
13 A. I don't believe so. 
14 Q. Was it your -- was it your understanding 
15 that Mr. Papse understood that the judge was not 
16 bound by the plea agreement? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Why do you think that he understood 
19 that? 
20 A. Well, because I explained to him in 
21 detail and the judge later explained it to him as 
22 well. I explained to him that plea agreement as far 
23 as the two plus two recommendation was just the 
24 recommendation of the prosecuting attorney, that it 
25 was up to the judge what he did with that 
Page 30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
questionnaire and it had to be accepted by the c7ourt. Q. What if it wasn't filled out or accepted 
by the court? 
A. Well, then there would be no plea 
agreement or no plea of guilty. 
"----·-- ------=---------
6 Q. Did that happen in this case? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. He also alleges that his answers during 
9 his change of plea were not true and that he parroted 
10 and mimicked what his attorney said. Is that your 
11 impression of that day? 
12 A. No, it's not. When we filled out the 
13 plea agreement we spent, like I said, a considerable 
14 amount of time making sure that they were accurate 
15 and understood the questions, When he was in court I 
16 think that he had some trouble not so much hearing 
17 but being able to hear the questions that were being 
18 asked. So I just simply went through the questions. 
19 You know, when he responded In a way that wasn't 
20 consistent with his form on some of the questions, I 
21 would talk briefly with him to make sure that he 
22 understood it, and when he did, make sure that he 
23 changed that response. 
24 Q. Did he change that response in reaction 
25 to any type of threat or coercion from you? 
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